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THE GOVERNMENT’S ROLE IN CLIMATE 
CHANGE INSURANCE 
PETER MOLK* 
Abstract: There are no robust insurance markets for climate change insur-
ance. While these markets would provide valuable loss-mitigation incentives, 
at the same time giving financial certainty to individuals and businesses that 
face staggering future liabilities, existing efforts have produced a fragmented 
set of private and public products that provide only piecemeal coverage. This 
Article examines the government’s role in providing unified markets for insur-
ing climate change risk. Although innovations in reinsurance markets suggest 
that private insurers could cover discrete risks associated with climate change, 
such as flood or wind loss, climate change’s broader systemic risks present 
problems of scale and scope that public insurance is better positioned to han-
dle. This Article draws lessons from existing insurance programs to show both 
why purely private insurance would be inappropriate for a robust climate 
change insurance market, as well as how a nationally provided insurance pro-
gram could be designed to avoid past problems. 
INTRODUCTION 
Climate change is a problem with which society is just beginning to 
grapple. The phenomenon has been associated with increasing frequency 
and severity of natural disasters.1 Hurricanes and wildfires have destroyed 
property and lives, and the danger is expected to rise.2 So too are sea levels, 
and the list of cities facing submersion resembles a “who’s who” of the At-
lantic coast.3 A 2015 report by the Environmental Protection Agency puts 
the expected costs to U.S. coastal property alone at $5 trillion; global costs 
factoring in the consequences of other damage sources are undoubtedly 
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 1 See Melissa Denchak, Are the Effects of Global Warming Really That Bad?, NAT. RES. DEF. 
COUNCIL (Mar. 15, 2016), https://www.nrdc.org/stories/are-effects-global-warming-really-bad [https://
perma.cc/8BW4-TZAB]. 
 2 See id. 
 3 See Surging Seas: Risk Zone Map, CLIMATE CENT., http://ss2.climatecentral.org/#12/40.
7298/-74.0070?show=satellite&projections=0-RCP85-SLR&level=5&unit=feet&pois=hide [https://
perma.cc/8AZU-45YK] (providing an interactive map demonstrating the effects of sea level rise 
on coastal cities). 
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higher.4 A key issue that naturally arises in the face of this imposing picture 
is how to mitigate exposure to these losses. 
Insurance markets are an admirable candidate. Because insurance pre-
miums reflect the insurer’s expected cost from covering a risk, insurance 
serves a regulatory function that promotes loss mitigation by private indi-
viduals.5 If a house is highly susceptible to flood risk, insurers expect rela-
tively high losses from covering that property, and individuals are charged a 
correspondingly high rate. The insurer’s expected losses—and the concomi-
tant insurance premium—decrease if the individual takes steps to reduce the 
risk, perhaps by building her house on stilts or deciding to site the house 
elsewhere at reduced exposure. Individuals therefore save money by reduc-
ing their risk exposure, and this desire to save on premiums will translate 
into reduced risk levels. Extending this analysis, we might think that society 
need not worry too greatly about the cost of climate change; private insur-
ance markets and policyholders’ responses to financial incentives will re-
duce much of its financial bite. 
The problem, however, is that private insurance markets do not cover 
many of the risks associated with climate change. Flood losses, for exam-
ple, are excluded under standard policies both in the United States and 
abroad. Wind losses in hurricane-prone states are covered if required by 
regulatory policy, or not at all. Crop losses are managed by the federal gov-
ernment, not private insurers. In fact, most any risk associated with climate 
change is excluded from private coverage.6 
A common vein running through the non-covered climate change risks 
is their correlated nature. Losses from climate change are not statistically 
independent: if one home is lost to flooding, the odds are high that its 
neighbors suffer flood losses, as well. Correlated losses are more expensive 
for insurers to cover, and the conventional argument goes that the expense 
of covering these risks is so considerable that insurers choose instead to 
exclude them, leaving individuals to self-insure or hope for government 
relief.7 In that case, private insurance offers no relief from climate change 
risk, and the only realistic alternative is to have the government step in with 
a public program. 
                                                                                                                           
 4 See ENVTL. PROT. AGENCY, CLIMATE CHANGE IN THE UNITED STATES: THE BENEFITS OF 
GLOBAL ACTION 7 (2015), http://www2.epa.gov/sites/production/files/2015-06/documents/cira
report.pdf [https://perma.cc/S96S-4B6X]. 
 5 See, e.g., Omri Ben-Shahar & Kyle D. Logue, Outsourcing Regulation: How Insurance Re-
duces Moral Hazard, 111 MICH. L. REV. 197, 199–201 (2012). 
 6 See generally Jeffrey W. Stempel, Rediscovering the Sawyer Solution: Bundling Risk for 
Protection and Profit, 11 RUTGERS J.L. & PUB. POL’Y 170, 179–80 (2013) (discussing the segre-
gation of insurance risks). 
 7 See infra notes 12–15 and accompanying text. 
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In Part I, this Article shows that this conventional explanation for in-
surers’ failure to cover climate change risk is lacking, particularly in light of 
recent advancements in risk financial products.8 Both theory and evidence 
suggest that private insurers are capable of handling correlated risks, and 
their reluctance to do so is better explained by specific noncompetitive as-
pects of the insurance shopping marketplace. 
The issue that then arises is whether it is desirable for private insurers 
to cover climate change risk that could justify regulatory intervention. Part 
II shows that in both an ideal world with no transaction costs and perfect 
markets as well as in a world more reflective of political realities, broad 
climate change risk appears better borne by a government system than by 
private insurers.9 
Part III considers how best to approach such a public system.10 Design-
ing a public insurance regime to be effective is a daunting challenge, and ex-
perience with prior attempts has shown the unexpected failures that can re-
sult. This Article offers some principles for government-led climate change 
insurance, drawing on the strengths and weaknesses of prior government-
sponsored insurance efforts. 
I. CAN PRIVATE INSURERS HANDLE THE RISK? 
Before considering whether private insurance companies would be su-
perior to a public program at covering climate change insurance, we must 
first address why they do not currently do so in the marketplace. Insurance 
companies already offer a variety of products, from the mundane like 
homeowners’ policies to more specialized products like insurance for alien 
abductions.11 Why not climate change insurance, or insurance for symptoms 
of climate change like floods, hurricanes, and the like? 
The conventional explanation for private insurers’ absence from this 
market is the difficulty insurers have in covering correlated risks. Indeed, 
several leading insurance law scholars point to this characteristic in explain-
ing the void left by private insurers.12 Correlated losses lead to lumpy 
claims where some years have large claim amounts and others have very 
little. Lumpy claims mean insurers must hold large reserves to handle those 
                                                                                                                           
 8 See infra notes 11–26 and accompanying text. 
 9 See infra notes 27–59 and accompanying text. 
 10 See infra notes 60–74 and accompanying text. 
 11 See Nathan Erb, Unusual Insurance Policies, GEICO (Sept. 29, 2014), https://www.geico.
com/more/saving/insurance-101/unusual-insurance-policies/ [http://perma.cc/S3DX-ERS4]. 
 12 KENNETH S. ABRAHAM, INSURANCE LAW AND REGULATION 258 (5th ed. 2010); Ro-
nen Avraham, The Economics of Insurance Law—A Primer, 19 CONN. INS. L.J. 29, 102–04 (2012); 
Scott E. Harrington, Rethinking Disaster Policy, 23 REGULATION 40, 42 (2000). 
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bad years with high payouts.13 These reserves must be safe and liquid, so 
they cannot be used for financing other operations or invested in high yield 
projects.14 They also incur undesirable tax treatment.15 These factors com-
bine to increase insurers’ costs of covering correlated risks. 
But of course insurers are not required to bear these costs stoically; 
they can and do pass these costs along to policyholders through increased 
premiums.16 The conventional argument therefore boils down to saying that 
the premiums that insurers must charge for correlated risks are so high that 
it is not even worth insurers’ time and effort to offer them, because few if 
any potential policyholders would pay the price. Instead, insurers do not 
cover correlated losses, such as the risks posed by climate change, and indi-
viduals instead self-insure. 
Given the massive markups that policyholders have been willing to 
pay for other insurance products, this explanation seems most unlikely. Pol-
icyholders pay premiums far exceeding expected losses in areas ranging 
from flight insurance to disease-specific life insurance to extended warranty 
insurance plans.17 Policyholders’ risk aversion—and thus insurers’ potential 
premium markups—should be at least as high for climate change risk as 
these other examples because of policyholders’ poor diversification. Most 
homeowners, for example, have just one home, and standard economic the-
ory predicts that they should therefore be willing to pay large premiums for 
insurance that protects the value of their largest asset from causes like 
floods. Surely a meaningful portion of individuals would pay for coverage 
rather than self-insure. The fact that they do not do so seems unlikely to be 
attributable simply to the correlated nature and expense of these risks for 
insurers.18 
Nor is it clear that correlated risks like those from climate change pre-
sent impossible problems to insurers that make covering them extremely 
costly. Although correlated risks can produce large aggregate losses in par-
ticularly unfortunate years, insurers increasingly write business across di-
                                                                                                                           
 13 Avraham, supra note 12, at 102. 
 14 See id. 
 15 E.g., Harrington, supra note 12, at 42. 
 16 See Avraham, supra note 12, at 102–03. 
 17 Tom Baker & Peter Siegelman, “You Want Insurance with That?” Using Behavioral Eco-
nomics to Protect Consumers from Add-On Insurance Products, 20 CONN. INS. L.J. 1, 2 (2013); 
Robert Eisner & Robert H. Strotz, Flight Insurance and the Theory of Choice, 69 J. POL. ECON. 
355, 355 (1961); Eric J. Johnson et al., Framing, Probability Distortions, and Insurance Deci-
sions, 7 J. RISK & UNCERTAINTY 35, 35–40 (1993). 
 18 Despite their poor diversification, many individuals appear largely unwilling to purchase 
coverage for low-probability losses. The large number of uninsureds in the wake of recent flood 
losses has vividly shown this point. For discussion of this apparent irrational response, see supra 
note 17 and accompanying text. 
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verse geographic and product lines.19 Even particularly devastating disasters 
therefore represent only a comparatively small portion of the insurer’s risk 
portfolio.20 Moreover, innovations in financial products have made it easier 
for insurers to cap their exposure to these risks, offloading excessive losses 
to diversified global financial markets or reinsurers.21 This too makes cov-
ering correlated losses more manageable for insurers. Finally, sequestering 
risky activities within limited liability subsidiaries provides an easy and 
low-cost means for insurers to guarantee that unexpectedly high correlated 
losses in one region and line do not spill over into other operations.22 Corre-
lated losses therefore do not present insurmountable problems to insurers. 
The point here is not that correlated losses are inexpensive to insure. 
Rather, private insurers are better equipped to bear those losses than are in-
dividuals, which furnishes the conditions necessary for a private market.23 
Yet if private insurers are comparatively better positioned than individuals 
to cover these risks, why are they not already routinely covered, perhaps as 
part of the standard homeowners’ insurance package? To answer this ques-
tion, we must focus on imperfections in the insurance marketplace. In a mar-
ket where individuals receive specific policy terms only after already agree-
ing to coverage, customers’ rational response is to comparison shop based 
solely on price and a rough sense of insurer quality.24 In such a market, in-
surers attract more business by offering lower premiums while maintaining 
perceived quality. An effective way of accomplishing this is to cut back on 
low-salience, low-probability coverage terms that, while expensive for in-
surers to include, are not terms for which most policyholders would look or 
care about most of the time.25 Eliminating these terms promotes savings 
                                                                                                                           
 19 See Avraham, supra note 12, at 103. 
 20 See id. at 38–39. 
 21 In addition to the growing capacity of reinsurers who act as insurance for insurance compa-
nies, insurance-linked securities like sidecars and catastrophe bonds allow insurers to diversify 
risk into the hands of individual investors, increasing the pool for potential diversification. 
 22 For example, State Farm has separate subsidiaries to conduct its high-risk California, Texas, 
and Florida property insurance operations. State Farm Companies, STATE FARM (2014), https://
www.statefarm.com/about-us/company-overview/company-profile/state-farm-companies [https://
perma.cc/UQ96-HUTK]. While the losses within the subsidiary become highly correlated, increasing 
the risk that the subsidiary faces, the losses to the larger organization are less risky because of the cap 
on losses afforded by limited liability. 
 23 See supra notes 16–22 and accompanying text. 
 24 See Daniel Schwarcz, Reevaluating Standardized Insurance Policies, 78 U. CHI. L. REV. 
1263, 1265–66 (2011). 
 25 Evidence suggests that consumers find only a few terms of standard form contracts to be 
relevant, and if terms that govern low-probability correlated risks are not among these, insurers 
can attract customers by excluding low-salience risks to reduce high-salience premiums, even if 
consumers would be willing to pay for low-salience risks to be covered. See Russell Korobkin, 
Bounded Rationality, Standard Form Contracts, and Unconscionability, 70 U. CHI. L. REV. 1203, 
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without significantly hurting the insurer’s reputation, giving it a compara-
tive advantage in the marketplace. The correlated risks we have been con-
sidering fit this description admirably. Absent a regulatory response requir-
ing coverage for these events, therefore, it seems likely that private insurers 
will continue to offer coverage for climate change risks, if at all, only as 
specialized endorsement add-ons on a case by case basis rather than as part 
of the overall standard package purchased by most individuals. Most cli-
mate change risks will thus remain uncovered by private insurers. 
Requiring insurers to provide coverage has been known to backfire in 
the past.26 Before considering such a regulatory response, we must first ex-
amine whether private insurers are even the appropriate vehicles for cover-
ing these risks. The following Part assesses the comparative advantage of 
private versus public insurance, in general and for the risks posed by cli-
mate change specifically. 
II. PUBLIC VERSUS PRIVATE INSURANCE 
The comparative advantages of public versus private insurers rests on 
balancing which is in a better position to bear climate change risk, which 
would do a better job at pricing insurance premiums, and which would 
more likely lead to mitigation of future climate change losses. The three 
                                                                                                                           
1207, 1225–34 (2003). Exacerbating this situation, many policyholders believe that they are already 
covered for correlated losses as part of their homeowners’ insurance. NAT’L ASS’N OF INS. 
COMM’RS, HOMEOWNERS, INSURANCE SURVEY 1 (2007), http://www.naic.org/documents/news
room_homeowners_insurance_summary.pdf [https://perma.cc/F7XS-8JU8] (identifying that one 
third of respondents believed that they had coverage for earthquake and for flood losses, both of 
which are excluded under standard policies). Other policyholders are thought to underestimate the 
value of insurance for certain low probability catastrophic losses, which can explain the low take-
up rates of subsidized flood insurance. See, e.g., HOWARD C. KUNREUTHER ET AL., INSURANCE 
& BEHAVIORAL ECONOMICS 113–18 (2013) (exploring a variety of behavioral explanations for 
individuals’ underpricing catastrophic risks); Howard Kunreuther & Mark Pauly, Neglecting Dis-
aster: Why Don’t People Insure Against Large Losses?, 28 J. RISK & UNCERTAINTY 5, 5 (2004) 
(focusing on individuals’ high costs to estimating accurately loss probabilities). Each of these 
situations pushes private insurers to eliminate catastrophic risk coverage. 
 26 Prior mandates have promoted unanticipated behavior by both insurers and private individ-
uals. See, e.g., Amy Monahan & Daniel Schwarcz, Will Employers Undermine Health Care by 
Dumping Sick Employees?, 97 VA. L. REV. 125, 174–88 (2011) (theorizing that the Affordable 
Care Act mandate’s incentive may lead to undesirable health plan redesign by private employers); 
Suja A. Thomas & Peter Molk, Employer Costs & Conflicts Under the Affordable Care Act, 99 
CORNELL L. REV. ONLINE 56, 56–58 (2013), http://cornelllawreview.org/files/2013/10/99CLRO5
0-OCTOBER.pdf [https://perma.cc/H4SU-53ZL] (analyzing the Affordable Care Act mandate’s 
incentives for private employer-employee interactions); The Valued Policy Law: Home View of 
the New-Hampshire Fire Insurance Law, N.Y. TIMES, Sept. 13, 1885, at 4 (quoting PORTSMOUTH 
(N.H.) TIMES, Sept. 11, 1885) (describing private insurers’ complete withdrawal from the home 
insurance market after a state-imposed coverage mandate). 
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often do not go hand in hand, which is one reason why resolving the issue 
of climate change insurance can be so difficult. 
Let us first assume a theoretically ideal world, in which both public 
and private insurance markets function perfectly and without transaction 
costs. In such a world, a public insurance plan is in a better position to bear 
climate change risk than are private insurers because of its superior ability 
to diversify and manage lumpy claims. Governments have access to the 
same risk-spreading mechanisms identified in Part I as private insurers, but 
governments have an additional advantage. Unlike private insurers, a gov-
ernment can always rely on its taxing power to cover periods when claims 
exceed revenues, using the general federal fisc to cover insurance claim 
shortfalls.27 The federal flood insurance program has done so for the past 
several years.28 The functionally unlimited revenue pool means a govern-
ment program need not hold large contingency reserves to cover the unex-
pectedly high loss years that correlated risks like climate change present; in 
bad years, the federally funded insurance program can borrow from other 
government revenue sources, while in good years it does not tie up re-
sources in reserves.29 If those sources begin to dry up, governments’ com-
pulsory taxing power can be employed to replenish them. A government’s 
ability to better diversify losses and manage the unpredictable nature of 
climate change claims risk puts it in a better position to bear climate change 
risk than private insurers. 
Consider next whether a public or private insurer would more accu-
rately price premiums in an ideal world. Accurate pricing is an important 
mechanism to reduce exposure to climate change risk; when premiums re-
spond to the risk of loss, private loss incentives are provided to individuals 
to mitigate or avoid exposure to that risk.30 In a theoretical ideal world, 
there would be no difference between public and private insurers’ risk mod-
eling and pricing practices—all would use the best actuarial models—and 
therefore there would be no difference in their pricing accuracy. In the real 
world, of course, this may not hold true and is an issue that is returned to 
later in this Part. 
                                                                                                                           
 27 See U.S. GOV’T ACCOUNTABILITY OFFICE, GAO-13-858T, NATIONAL FLOOD INSURANCE 
PROGRAM: CONTINUED ATTENTION NEEDED TO ADDRESS CHALLENGES 1 (2013), http://www.gao.
gov/assets/660/657939.pdf [http://perma.cc/D35C-7WBD]. 
 28 See id. at 4. As of 2013, the national flood insurance program had borrowed approximately 
$24 billion from the federal government to cover premium shortfalls. Id. 
 29 See Neil Buchanan, Good Deficits: Protecting the Public Interest from Deficit Hysteria, 31 
VA. TAX REV. 75, 83 (2011). 
 30 See supra note 5 and accompanying text. See generally Peter Molk, The Ownership of 
Health Insurers, 2016 U. ILL. L. REV. (forthcoming) (discussing this in the context of health insur-
ance). 
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Finally, let us examine whether public or private insurance would be 
more likely to lead to future loss mitigation and avoidance. As just dis-
cussed, in a theoretical ideal world, both public and private insurance would 
lead to identical private mitigation incentives for individuals through pre-
mium pricing. But private incentives go only so far in avoiding the types of 
risks posed by climate change, like hurricanes, wildfires, and rising sea lev-
els. Public projects, including sea walls, fire brigades, and levies, can be 
very effective measures in combating these risks.31 For the full loss avoid-
ance signals sent by insurance to be realized, the entity that bears the risk of 
loss—the insurer—needs to be the same one that can take steps to mitigate 
losses through facilitating these public projects.32 When the insurance is 
public, those incentives are aligned, as the government is both assuming the 
risk of climate change and is the entity that can institute public works pro-
jects. With private insurers, the incentives are fully aligned only if coordina-
tion among private insurers, governments, lobbyists, and private individuals 
can be achieved—possible in our theorized world, but unlikely in the real 
world and is an issue that is returned to later. 
Assessing the three dimensions of success in our ideal world, public 
insurance comes out on top in risk-bearing ability and is ranked similarly to 
private insurers for both pricing accuracy and loss mitigation. In that world, 
public insurance would be the superior choice. But of course, we do not live 
in an idealized world. Does anything change when we relax assumptions 
and incorporate real world attributes? It turns out that here too, there is rea-
son to believe that public insurance will be the better option. 
If one looks at the real world, the argument for government insurance’s 
superior ability to weather losses and therefore bear risk remains un-
changed. Governments have access to the same financial markets as private 
insurers, while retaining the advantage of diversifying losses across time 
without holding large reserves.33  
The argument for private insurers’ superiority at pricing risk, however, 
grows stronger at first blush. Private insurers face competitive market pres-
sure to make money. This pressure encourages insurers to develop detailed 
risk assessment models—and therefore pricing mechanisms—that incorpo-
rate diverse factors material to risk levels, because insurers with superior 
                                                                                                                           
 31 See Katherine M. Baldwin, NEPA and CEQA: Effective Legal Frameworks for Compelling 
Consideration of Adaptation to Climate Change, 82 S. CAL. L. REV. 769, 778–79 (2009) (discuss-
ing the need for communities to implement effective adaptive solutions to combat the risks posed 
by climate change). 
 32 For instance, if an insurer could reduce its losses by $100 if it built a $50 sea wall, yet it 
had no ability to erect the wall, efficient loss mitigation steps are not taken. 
 33 See supra notes 27–29 and accompanying text. 
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pricing efficiency gain a competitive advantage by attracting low-risk poli-
cyholders while avoiding high-risk ones.34 Better pricing models send more 
accurate loss mitigation signals to policyholders and promote more optimal 
loss avoidance.35 
Governments, on the other hand, face weaker pricing pressure.36 Gov-
ernment-provided insurance would face no competitive pressure to price 
insurance policies accurately, and therefore a public plan’s premiums would 
be less likely to reflect the underlying risk.37 Indeed, in the context of flood 
insurance—overwhelmingly sold by the federal government—risk premi-
ums are set almost exclusively by the property elevation and a rough estimate 
of regional factors, ignoring property-specific attributes that would alter flood 
risk exposure.38 These weak pricing models translate into weak loss mitiga-
tion signals for policyholders.39 
Further undermining public insurers’ pricing accuracy is their vulnera-
bility to political pressure to reduce rates for high risk policyholders below 
actuarial levels.40 Political economy models show that high salience costs 
disproportionately incurred by a politician’s constituents will often result in 
preferential treatment for those constituents, even when an alternative 
course would be better for society.41 Recent attempts to realign the federal 
flood insurance program with actuarial pricing are a good example of this 
                                                                                                                           
 34 See Avraham, supra note 12, at 44–45. 
 35 See U.S. GOV’T ACCOUNTABILITY OFFICE, GAO-15-290, HIGH RISK SERIES: AN UPDATE 
80 (2015), http://www.gao.gov/assets/670/668415.pdf [https://perma.cc/RH9M-8836] (explaining 
that federal crop insurance policyholders may receive inaccurate signals about their risk due to 
subsidies); Jeffrey R. Brown et al., Federal Terrorism Risk Insurance 6 (Nat’l Bureau of Econ. Re-
search, Working Paper No. 9271, 2002), http://www.nber.org/papers/w9271.pdf [https://perma.cc/
8NQ2-YQ75] (discussing the signaling effect of pricing models in the context of federally backed 
terrorism insurance). 
 36 See Ben-Shahar & Logue, supra note 5, at 235. 
 37 See id. 
 38 See TECHNICAL DOCUMENTATION OF NFIP ACTUARIAL ASSUMPTIONS AND METHODS: 
SUPPORTING RATES EFFECTIVE OCTOBER 1, 2013, at 3–7 (n.d.), https://www.fema.gov/media-
library-data/a10327c71a76f7c88d7cf403dcf60f4f/Actuarial%20Methods%20and%20Assumptions
%202013-09-04_508.pdf [https://perma.cc/3LDT-7GVP]. 
 39 See Ben-Shahar & Logue, supra note 5, at 246 (examining how the market interprets the 
correlation between insurance premiums and risk level); Mark J. Browne & Martin Halek, Manag-
ing Flood Risk: The National Flood Insurance Program and Alternatives, in PUBLIC INSURANCE 
AND PRIVATE MARKETS 143, 144 (Jeffrey R. Brown ed., 2010). 
 40 Robert E. Litan, Sharing and Reducing the Financial Risks of Future “Mega-Catastrophe” 
23 (Brookings Inst., Economic Studies Working Paper, 2005), http://www.brookings.edu/views/
papers/litan/20051111financialrisks.pdf [https://perma.cc/JYT8-4J7J]. 
 41 See, e.g., Barry R. Weingast, Regulation, Reregulation, and Deregulation: The Political Foun-
dations of Agency Clientele Relationships, 44 LAW & CONTEMPORARY PROBLEMS 147, 159 (1981), 
http://scholarship.law.duke.edu/cgi/viewcontent.cgi?article=3611&context=lcp [https://perma.cc/
RPC4-J9XP]. 
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behavior. Legislation to reform the prior system of pricing subsidies and 
require actuarial pricing passed in 2012.42 Once the rate changes began to 
go into effect in 2014, however, they were unwound despite the endorse-
ments by most analysts of the reform. Actuarially fair rates meant large 
premium increases for disproportionately few policyholders, and their pro-
tests at these increases proved too hard to ignore.43 
Unfortunately, as this Article has shown, accurate premium pricing is 
what provides valuable private loss mitigation incentives.44 If government-
provided insurance premiums only poorly reflect the underlying risk, then 
important loss-avoidance price signals are not sent.45 In fact, when public 
insurance premiums drift too far from their actuarial basis, exposure to risk 
is actually encouraged—a perverse outcome indeed.46 We might therefore 
think that accurate pricing incentives driven by competitive forces are a dis-
tinct advantage of private insurers. 
Because the issue is now being analyzed from a real world perspective, 
however, we must also look at political economy dynamics to question 
whether private insurers will have the freedom to implement their prices 
that may be better attuned to underlying risks. Insurance is a heavily regu-
lated industry, with pricing subject to regulatory approval. Both past experi-
ence and theory suggest that this regulatory process will distort private in-
surers’ pricing away from true risk levels, just as with public insurance.47 
The differential exposure to climate change risk implies disparate insurance 
premiums that would provoke backlash from policyholders.48 This public 
backlash in the past has translated into regulator-imposed premium ceilings, 
which brings us back to the situation where at least some premiums no 
                                                                                                                           
 42 Biggert-Waters Flood Insurance Reform Act of 2012, Pub. L. No. 112-141, 126 Stat. 916 
(codified as amended at 42 U.S.C. §§ 4001–4130 (2014)). 
 43 Homeowner Flood Insurance Affordability Act of 2014, Pub. L. No. 113-89, 128 Stat. 1020 
(codified as amended at 42 U.S.C. §§ 4001–4033 (2014)); Jennifer Wriggins, Flood Money: The 
Challenges of U.S. Flood Insurance Reform in a Warming World, 119 PENN. ST. L. REV. 361, 
410–21 (2014) (analyzing the factors leading to adoption and rollback of flood insurance reform). 
 44 See supra notes 33–35 and accompanying text. 
 45 George L. Priest, Government Insurance Versus Market Insurance, 28 GENEVA PAPERS ON 
RISK & INS. 71, 74–75 (2003); George L. Priest, The Government, the Market, and the Problem of 
Catastrophic Loss, 12 J. RISK & UNCERTAINTY 219, 232 (1996). 
 46 The National Flood Insurance Program’s subsidization of high flood risk zones has been 
identified as a cause of increasing flood risk exposure over time. See, e.g., Kenneth J. Bagstad et 
al., Taxes, Subsidies, and Insurance as Drivers of United States Coastal Development, 63 ECO-
LOGICAL ECON. 285, 287 (2007). 
 47 See George Schieber & Akiko Maeda, A Curmudgeon’s Guide to Financing Health Care in 
Developing Countries, in INNOVATIONS IN HEALTH CARE FINANCING 1, 100 (George J. Schieber 
ed., 1997). 
 48 See supra notes 38–43 and accompanying text (discussing the case of flood insurance). 
2016] The Government’s Role in Climate Change Insurance 421 
longer reflect underlying risk.49 It is not difficult to find examples where this 
has occurred in the past. California voters, for example, famously led regula-
tors to cap auto insurance rates in 1988.50 Florida’s regulator-imposed proper-
ty insurance rates subsidize high risk homes along the coast.51 And so on. 
Therefore, while private insurers may, if left to their own devices, 
more accurately match premiums to underlying risk levels than would a 
public insurer, the same forces that pressure a public plan to subsidize high 
risk premiums are poised to produce the same outcome under a system of 
private insurers. In other words, private insurers’ advantage in pricing re-
sponsiveness is eaten away by political realities. 
Finally, let us look at whether public or private insurers would do a 
better job of loss mitigation in the real world. To the extent that private in-
surance more accurately matches premiums to underlying risk, then private 
insurers do a better job of promoting individual-level loss mitigation 
steps.52 More so than other insurance lines, however, climate change risk is 
managed by large scale public good projects. Building codes, seawalls and 
levees, emissions standards, firebreaks, and a host of other projects like 
these could meaningfully reduce future losses due to climate change. When 
the benefits of lower risk levels entirely accrue to a single entity, as in the 
case of public insurance, investments in these projects are more likely.53 
But when the benefits are spread across multiple insurers, as would be the 
case with a private climate change insurance system, and when noncontrib-
uting insurers cannot be excluded from realizing these benefits, as is inher-
ently the case with these public goods investments, there will be underin-
vestment in efficient loss mitigation measures.54 
Moreover, enacting these public works risk mitigation projects requires 
large scale coordination. In a world with no transactions costs, private par-
ties could negotiate and coordinate to collect an assessment from all New 
Orleans residents or private insurers, acquire contiguous privately owned 
plots from private owners, and erect a water retention system. But in a real 
                                                                                                                           
 49 See supra notes 38–43 and accompanying text. 
 50 For analysis of the effects of this intervention, see Dwight M. Jaffee & Thomas Russell, 
Regulation of Automobile Insurance in California, in DEREGULATING PROPERTY-LIABILITY IN-
SURANCE: RESTORING AND INCREASING MARKET EFFICIENCY 195, 196 (J. David Cummins ed., 
2002). 
 51 Omri Ben-Shahar & Kyle D. Logue, The Perverse Effects of Subsidized Weather Insurance, 4, 
14 (U. Mich. Law Sch., Law & Econ. Working Papers, Paper No. 111, 2015), http://repository.
law.umich.edu/cgi/viewcontent.cgi?article=1221&context=law_econ_current [https://perma.cc/H7CE-
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 52 See Browne & Halek, note 39, at 144. 
 53 See supra note 32 and accompanying text. 
 54 For more on the subject of public goods, see ANDREU MAS-COLELL ET AL., MICROECO-
NOMIC THEORY 359 (1995). 
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world with positive transaction costs, government compulsion—for in-
stance, the power of eminent domain—may provide the only practical 
means of overcoming an inability to coordinate.55 Many suggested climate 
change mitigation efforts, including emission standards, building standards, 
or even acquiring the land necessary for public works projects, could bene-
fit from a government’s ability to solve coordination difficulties in a world 
with transaction costs. Left to their own devices, private parties and private 
insurers cannot therefore engage in the same level of loss avoidance 
measures. 
Further, when viewing the problem through the lens of the real world, 
we must also acknowledge the impacts from post-disaster relief programs 
sponsored by governments. It is inevitable that after natural disasters of the 
kind posed by climate change, public assistance is provided to the unin-
sured.56 The aftermath of Hurricanes Katrina and Sandy, for example, 
brought publicly financed rebuilding subsidies for individuals, even though 
flood insurance policies would have provided coverage for these losses had 
they been purchased.57 Of course, it is undesirable to render uninsured indi-
viduals destitute because they did not buy insurance. Relief programs like 
these, however, undermine the loss avoidance and mitigation incentives that 
both individuals and private insurers otherwise feel: individuals, because 
some or all of their loss is reimbursed through government relief, and pri-
vate insurers, because a post-disaster insurance regime encourages individ-
uals to forego private insurance coverage by making private insurance less 
necessary.58  
If the entity that provides the disaster relief is also the entity that pro-
vides the insurance, however, as is the case in a public insurance program, 
there will be closer to optimal levels of loss mitigation investment because 
the losses are all borne by the same entity. Therefore, from a societal per-
spective, a publicly provided insurance program would unify the loss miti-
gation incentives within a single entity and provide the strongest incentives 
for proper levels of loss avoidance. This stems from the public good attrib-
utes of many loss mitigation measures, which distinguish this situation from 
                                                                                                                           
 55 See R.H. Coase, The Problem of Social Cost, 3 J.L. & ECON. 1, 16 (1960). 
 56 See CAROLYN KOUSKY & LEONARD SHABMAN, THE REALITIES OF FEDERAL DISASTER 
AID: THE CASE OF FLOODS 2 (2012), http://www.rff.org/files/sharepoint/WorkImages/Download/
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 57 See Rachel Cleetus, Sandy Exposed Flood Insurance Failure, AL JAZEERA AM. (Oct. 27, 
2013), http://america.aljazeera.com/articles/2013/10/27/sandy-exposed-floodinsurancefailure.html 
[https://perma.cc/6LP4-RRYS]. 
 58 See id. 
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more familiar insurance lines that are served by private insurers like auto, 
home, or life insurance.59 
To summarize, in both a theoretically ideal and a more realistic world, 
publicly provided climate change insurance offers potential advantages over a 
private program. Only if it is assumed that a public program would have se-
vere relative shortfalls in its pricing system might a private insurance pro-
gram make sense. Part III, therefore, considers how to construct a public pro-
gram, paying particular attention to how to ensure pricing responsiveness. 
III. PUBLIC INSURANCE DESIGN 
In designing a public insurance program, there are two basic options. 
The first is to have the program run entirely by a public entity. A second 
option is to partner a public program with participation by private insurers. 
This Part examines both. 
A. Exclusively Public Insurance Programs 
First consider an exclusively public insurance program. The advantage 
of such a program is its ability to capitalize fully on the comparative ad-
vantages offered by public insurance. But in practice, it is difficult to find 
instances of a purely public insurance program that exists without private 
partnership. 
Florida’s Citizens Property Insurance Corporation (“Citizens”), a pure-
ly public program, provides clues regarding why. Funded by premiums and 
the pockets of Florida’s populace, Citizens provides property insurance 
coverage for high risk homes along the Florida coast.60 The muted pricing 
incentives that a non-private entity faces have combined with interest group 
lobbying to produce a pricing scheme that systematically undervalues risk 
levels, particularly high risks.61 As we have seen, this has the perverse con-
sequence of encouraging exposure to risks, rather than encouraging loss 
mitigation. 
How could a public program be constructed to address the tendency to 
underprice high risks but still offer the benefits of public insurance? The 
key is to design a public program with accountability similar to what private 
markets offer for private insurers. One promising way is to harness the 
power of transparency. In the past, disclosure of pricing imbalances has 
prompted pricing reforms of public insurance programs, including Citi-
                                                                                                                           
 59 See supra notes 52–54 and accompanying text. 
 60 About Us, CITIZENS PROP. INS. CORP., https://www.citizensfla.com/web/public/who-we-are 
[https://perma.cc/9R93-D8CB]. 
 61 See Ben-Shahar & Logue, supra note 51, at 12–15. 
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zens.62 In the absence of market discipline, the accountability provided by 
disclosure could be a useful substitute. To be meaningful, the disclosure 
must be made on a regular basis and quantify the severity of pricing imbal-
ances. The latter could be accomplished by, for example, disclosing the per-
centage and distribution of policies offered at below-actuarial prices as well 
as the geographic distribution of the subsidies.63 The prospect of the exist-
ence and magnitude of preferential subsidies becoming public—and the 
resulting backlash—would hopefully provide a substitute incentive to keep 
policies accurately priced. 
B. Partnerships Between Public Programs and Private Insurers 
A purely public program is not the only possibility. Several insurance 
programs try to combine advantages of both public and private insurance 
with the downsides of neither.64 The attempts fall into two approaches. Un-
der the first, the government prices policies and is financially responsible 
for paying out claims, but private insurers administer the program and sell 
policies.65 The federal flood insurance and crop insurance programs are ex-
amples of this method.66 Under the second approach, private insurers are 
responsible for pricing, selling, and administering policies, while the gov-
ernment commits to sharing some of the losses that are incurred.67 The fed-
erally backed terrorism insurance is an example of this method.68 
The first approach offers little meaningful advantage over a pure pub-
lic program. Administration by private insurers could potentially offer ad-
ministrative efficiencies, but as a practical matter private insurers have little 
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incentive to invest in selling government-backed policies, reducing policy 
take-up rates and the insurance program’s effectiveness.69 These problems 
have been particularly severe with the National Flood Insurance Program. 
One reason that few people purchase flood insurance is because small pay-
ments to private insurers do not make it worthwhile for them to invest much 
time or effort in marketing the policies.70 And irrespective of any saved 
administrative costs, a privately administered public program suffers from 
the same overarching non-responsive pricing problems as does a purely 
public program: private insurers administer policies, but the public insurer 
prices them.71 
A public/private partnership approach where the government assumes 
some or all losses above a threshold is more promising. If the government 
commits to covering most or all losses beyond a certain point, then private 
insurers are more likely to enter the market as their cost of providing cover-
age decreases.72 Moreover, because private insurers are in charge of pricing, 
premiums’ responsiveness to risk level is maintained while achieving the 
broader efficiencies of a competitive marketplace. 
This solution too, however, is imperfect. When private insurers bear 
only a portion of losses, they face only a muted incentive to price premiums 
to reflect risk, and so insurance premiums’ loss mitigation signals are 
dampened.73 Moreover, to the extent that market imperfections currently 
encourage insurers to eliminate coverage for correlated losses of the type 
likely to be experienced from climate change, a government loss backstop is 
not going to provide meaningful change.74 Instead, it seems likely that pri-
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vate insurers would cover this risk only with the addition of a government 
mandate, which however desirable would severely test the mettle of even 
the most seasoned politician to implement. 
In sum, a publicly provided insurance program would not be without 
its challenges. Recognizing a government insurance program’s comparative 
disadvantages up front and intelligently designing around them could min-
imize these disadvantages. Both pure public programs and public/private 
partnerships have relative strengths, so the ultimate choice comes down to 
beliefs about the magnitude of these comparative advantages. 
CONCLUSION 
Climate change threatens substantial societal burdens, and mitigating 
those burdens is highly desirable. While much of the focus to date has been 
on legislative measures, climate change insurance could provide powerful 
mitigation signals and the financial certainty that is so important in our 
modern lives. Although it is likely that private insurers have the capacity to 
handle much of the risk involved, relying exclusively on private insurers is 
a second-best solution. Because the large scale risks involved are often best 
avoided with public good projects and the aid of government intervention, 
placing a climate change insurance product in government hands could be 
the best means to this end. 
